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THE HIDDEN EQUITY
An Analysis of the Moral Content of the Principles
of Equity
By RALPH A. NEWMAN*
TBE importance of equity in the structure of law has been recog-
nized since classical antiquity and beyond, but its precise nature has
proved difficult to define. There are those who have despaired of
arriving at a definition,' and it has been suggested that it is safer to
describe equity than to attempt to define it.2 There is no doubt that
for long periods equity has constituted in many legal systems a valu-
able force in introducing into the law elevated standards of conduct
which are thoroughly accepted in all systems of ethics and morals,
and in eliminating practices which except in the law are almost uni-
versally condemned. A leading civilian jurist has referred to equity
as one of the names under which is concealed the creative force which
animates the life of the law.3 Serious doubt has been expressed, how-
ever, whether, in legal systems whose norms have been shaped by
moral considerations, equity may not have ceased to serve any useful
purpose, and whether it should not be allowed to disappear as a sepa-
rate component of law.4 In most civil law systems the fundamental
principles of equity are applied as a matter of course in all situations
in which they are relevant.5 In the common law system we are not
only uncertain as to just what equity is, but as to just what to do with
it, whatever it may be. What we actually do with it is very surpris-
ing. We apply the principles of equity in some areas of law, but we
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law.
1 "Unless one lures himself with the mirages of metaphysics, equity
escapes any logical definition." H. DE PAGE, A PROPOS Du GOUVERNWEMENT DES
JUGES; L'EQUITE EN FACE DU DROIT 161 (1931), quoted in Razi, Reflections on
Equity in the Civil Law System, 13 Am. U.L. REV. 24, 26, n.13 (1963). "Equity
has at no time lent itself to very exact definition." Hanbury, The Field of
Modern Equity, in ESSAYS IN EQUIT 23 (1934).
2 2 J. BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AN JURISPRUDENCE 581 (1901).
3 J. Puig Brutau, Juridical Evolution and Equity, in ESSAYS IN JURIS-
PRUDENCE IN HONOR Op ROSCOE POUND 82, 84 (R. Newman ed. 1962). Similar
importance has been attached to equity by H. CAPiAITA, REVUE TRIMESTRIELE
371 (1928); LEVY-ULLMAN, LE SYSTEME JURIDIQUE DE L'ANGLETERRE 564 (1928).
4 D. KERLY, HISTORY OF EQUITY 292 (1890); Lasswell & McDougal, Legal
Education and Public Policy, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 255 (1943): "Equity. What
useful purpose is served by putting this rag-bag of stuff between two covers?"
Maitland at times thought of equity as "a short sighted busybody." Fratcher,
Book Review, Letters of William Maitland, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 122, 125, n.24
(1966).
5 "For a continental judge law and equity are not opposites, but equity
is an integral part of the law." A. Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 284 (1959).
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fail to apply them in other wider areas in which they are equally
relevant. We recognize the fact that the principles of equity impose
higher standards of moral conduct than the standards of common
law,6 but the question of why these elevated standards are not applied
throughout the law is seldom raised, even by those who emphasize
the importance of such standards in the moralization of law.
Analysis of the nature of equity is made still more difficult by
the fact that equity is always in transition. "A part of what is now
strict law was formerly considered as equity; and the equitable deci-
sions of this age will unavoidably be ranked under the strict law of
the next."7 In the unending process of conforming legal norms to the
currently accepted moral standards of society, lawmakers commonly
use the word equity to mean what is fair and just;s but since the aim
of all law is to do justice, this sense of the term leads only to an identi-
fication of the role of equity with the role of law, and provides little
6 "There are many duties that belong to the class of imperfect obliga-
tions which are binding on conscience, but which human laws do not and
cannot, undertake to enforce. But when the aid of a court of equity is sought
to carry into execution such a contract, then the principles of ethics have a
more extensive sway; and a purchase made with such a reservation of supe-
rior knowledge would be of too sharp a character to be aided and forwarded
in its execution by the powers of the Court of Chancery." 2 KENT, COm-
MENTARIES *490.
"An agreement, to be entitled to be carried into specific performance,
ought to be certain, fair, and just in all its parts. Courts of equity will not
decree a specific performance in cases of fraud or mistake, or of hard and
unconscionable bargains." 2 J. STORY, EQUITY § 769 (13th ed. 1886).
"If then . . . the plaintiff has obtained [the agreement] by sharp and
unscrupulous practices, by overreaching, by trickery, by taking undue advan-
tage of his position, . . . or by any other unconscientious means,-then a spe-
cific performance will be refused." 4 J. PomROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE §
1405(a) (5th ed. 1941).
These statements by giants of the law have been reiterated, without crit-
ical analysis of the distinction, in modern times. E.g., De Garmo v. Goldman,
19 Cal. 2d 755, 765, 123 P.2d 1, 6 (1942); Dale v. Jennings, 90 Fla. 234, 246,
107 So. 175, 180 (1925); Mainelli v. Neuhaus, 157 Neb. 392, 396, 59 N.W.2d 607,
610 (1953); Bowker v. Cunningham, 78 N.J. Eq. 458, 461-63, 79 A. 608, 610
(Ch. 1911); Sullivan v. Jennings, 44 N.J. Eq. 11, 14 A. 104 (Ch. 1888); Cuff
v. Dorland, 50 Barb. 438 (N.Y. 1878), rev'd, 55 Barb. 481 (N.Y. 1876). See
generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 367 (a), -(b), -(c), comment a (1932).
7 MILLAR, HISTORICAL ViEw OF ENGLISH GovmIuiAENT Bk. II, ch. vii
quoted in R. Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 CoLum. L. REV. 20, 24 (1905).
8 C. ALLEN, LAw x TN =E MAXNG 405 (6th ed. 1958); 2 J. AUSTN, LECTURES
ON JURISPRUDENCE 639-40 (3rd ed. 1869); DIGEST 1.1.1.3: "Honeste vivere,
neminem laedere, suum cuique tribuere"; W. FRDmANN, LAW IN A CHANGING
SOCIETY 453 (1959): "'General Equity' is a means of infusing legal ideals;
the creative function of judicial equity, fairness, common sense or justice has
translated itself into numerous practical applications;" Holdsworth, Reception
of Roman Law in the Sixteenth Century, 28 L.Q. REv. 236, 239 (1912):
"[Equity is] that which is right." H. JoLowicz, LEcTmUs ON JuRisPRUDENcE
262 (1963): "Equity . . . is simply a tendency to look to the spirit rather
than to the letter of the law and to apply general ideas of what is fair rather
than specific rules."
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guidance for determining the function of equity itself. There has
been a serious dearth of inquiry into a more precise meaning of what
might be called pure equity, to distinguish it from equity in the sense
of what is fair and just. Most efforts to systematize equitable doc-
trine in collections of principles have failed to penetrate to the under-
lying concepts from which the principles have been derived. As
Lord Evershed has said, "the principles of equity illustrate, nay illum-
inate, but never precisely define, the concept which lies behind, un-
derstood but unexpressed."9  Modern research into the nature of
equity has manifested an unfortunate tendency to look at equity as a
system of remedies'--an approach which distracts attention from the
nature of the substantive rights and duties which the equitable rem-
edies enforce. The prevailing uncertainty in all legal systems as to the
nature of equity is due largely to inadequate analysis of the na-
ture of the fundamental concepts upon which the principles of
equity rest. The truth is that there is no such "thing" as equity.
Equity is neither a system nor a process, but is a method of adjusting
conflicting interests in accordance with ideals of decent and honorable
conduct in an ethically maturing society.
At the dawn of recorded history there is a wide gap between law
and morals. The predominating need of the social group is peace and
security, and law at this stage of social evolution is primarily an in-
strument for group survival. The consequences of violation of the
law must be certain and inexorable, requiring rigid rules which deal
with ordinary situations falling into definite categories." The stand-
ards by which conduct is to be judged are determined by the needs of
the community as a whole rather than by the needs of the individuals
immediately concerned.12 Since at this stage of the evolution of law
certainty is more important than individual justice, circumstances
which present variations from the ordinary situations are ignored.
As Saint Thomas said, the lawmaker cannot have in mind every single
case. Since the beginnings of law the gap between law and morals
has narrowed, but there are reasons why the gap can never be com-
pletely overcome. There is no doubt that for a time, after the emanci-
pation of law in the 16th century from the claim of the Universal
Church to a monopoly of moral authority, apprehension of the loss of
the law's newly won autonomy was responsible for the insistence on
9 R. EVERSHED, ASPECTS OF ENGLISH EQunTY 17 (1954).
10 See, e.g., C. CLARX, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (1930), where the author
put all equity except relief for mistake, fraud, and unjust enrichmenit into his
casebook on procedure.
11 "The rules of primitive knowledge usually occur as imperative, -or,- at
least, normative statements, since they are formulated invariably -so as to fit
pragmatic concepts." Malinowski, A New Instrument for the Interpretation
of Law-Especially Primitive, 51 YALE L.J. 1237, 1243 (1942).
12 R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILosOPHY oFLAw 14-15"-(1954);
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rigid norms which would be impervious to modification on moral
grounds.1 3 Voltaire, who lived for many years in England, felt that
one of the primary achievements of law in that country was the right
of every man to be judged in any matter only according to precise
laws.14 In modern times a similar reluctance of law to accept moral
standards as an element of its norms is due to the fact that the appli-
cation of moral standards requires examination of circumstances
which vary widely from case to case, leaving an important part of the
judicial process to discretion. Since the reception of the principles
of equity into the norms of law takes place through the substitution
of flexible principles in place of rigid rules, distrust of the discretion
of judges has continued to retard the reception of equity. 5 A more
basic reason for the reluctance of law to receive without reservation
the principles of equity is what Radbruch has called the antinomy
between legal certainty and justice.16 There exists in law an inherent
conflict between the goal of certainty, so important to the mainte-
nance of social order, and the goal of justice, so important to the indi-
vidual. In systems of ethics and morals there are no finite limits to
the extent to which standards of upright and humane conduct can be
accepted as blinding norms. In law, since law must be not only hu-
mane but certain, individual justice must yield in many situations tc
the interests of society as a whole. "The law insists on form, equity
and natural law on justice in the ethical sense."'71 "Every ethic,"
Bronowski says, "must hold a man within his society, and yet it must
make him feel that he follows his own free bent. No ethic is effective
which does not link both these, the social duty with the sense of indi-
viduality. The sense of human dignity creates the universal identity
of man."'8
The necessity for legal norms which are flexible enough to permit
their application to particular circumstances has been noted by great
thinkers since Homer.19 To Plato, equity meant a breaking away
13 Referring to the apprehension of the possible consequences of a wide
discretion on the part of judges, on the establishment in Massachusetts of a
court of equity after 250 years, see Woodruff, Chancery in Massachusetts, 5
L.Q. REv. 370, 379 (1889).
14 See VOLTARE, PHmosoPHIcAL DCTiONARY, Government, (1843) cited by
W. DURANT, THE AGE OF VOLTAmE 247 (1965).
15 See Clark, The Limits of Judicial Objectivity, 12 Amv. U.L. REv. 1
(1963).
16 G. RADBRUCn, VORSCHULE DER REcHTsPHmI.OPr.rs 3 (1959).
17 R. PouND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 141 (1921).
18 J. BRONowsxi, THE IDENTITY or MAN 106 (Eng. ed. 1967).
19 PLATO, LAws, Bk. I, 640(b), quoting HOMER, ODYssEY, Bk. IX, ii,
112-15:
Mootless are they and lawless. On the peak of mountains high
They dwell in hollow caves,
Where each his own law deals to wife and child
In sovereign disregard of all his peers.
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from what is precise. 20  In classical antiquity equity corrected fail-
ures of justice which occurred because of the inability of strict law
to adjust its rigid rules to unusual circumstances. At first, relief was
given in the form of royal dispensation.2 ' As society becomes more
humane, the rules of law soften so as to enable the judge to take into
account circumstances which vary from one case to another. The rec-
ognition of moral values as falling within the province of law left the
criteria of decisions much less clearly defined. The distinction be-
tween the rigid rules of strict law and the flexible principles of equity
was especially evident in the Anglo-American system of administra-
tion of law and equity in separate courts. An equity which corrected
the law by applying standards so obscure as to preclude objective eval-
uation would itself be lawless, 22 and in 19th century a reaction set in
which led to a hardening of the norms which had been established in
the Court of Chancery, a phenomenon which had occurred in Roman
praetorian equity 2,000 years before. In the contemporary stage of
the evolution of law there is urgent need for legal norms which will
permit necessary flexibility of application and yet provide adequately
for certainty. To do this, it is necessary to reduce to more precise
formulation the basic concepts by which the moral content of law is to
be determined. If men were angels, the standards of ethics and morals
would provide the moral content of all legal norms. Since men are
less than angels, the need arises for a pure equity to provide specific
statement of the moral objectives of law. As Northrop has said, "Law
provides ethics with explicitly expressed content as formulated by the
people themselves of a given culture."23 There are of course many
factors which enter into the requirements of justice, but almost all
schools of legal philosophy agree that morality is one of the essential
elements of law.2 4 The necessity even in early law for royal dispen-
20 PLATO, LAws, Bk. VI, 757(d), -(e). Aristotle said that equitable jus-
tice considers the unique individual circumstances which demand a departure
from the rigid rules. ARiSTomLE, Nicom cHEAN EmTcs 1131 (Ross transl.).
21 "Let any oppressed man, who has a cause, come before my image as
king of righteousness." CODE or- HAmmuRABi (cir. 1961 B.C.) (closing state-
ment). See 2 S. PUFENDORF, THE ELEMENTS Or UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE, 164-
65 (W. Oldfather transl. 1931) (Pufendorf wrote in 1660).
22 R. POUND, supra note 12, at 54: "There has been a continual move-
ment in legal history back and forth between wide discretion and strict de-
tailed rule, between justice without law, as it were, and justice according to
law."
23 F. NORTHROP, THE COmPLExinEs or LEGAL AND ETHIcAL EXPERIENcE 183
(1959).
24 J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 303 (2nd ed. 1921): "In all
civilized societies the courts are impliedly directed to decide in accordance
with the precepts of morality."
P. VINOGRADOFF, COMMON SENSE IN LAW 247 (1914): "The ... view that
in an enlightened age positive law has to be estimated by the standard of
moral ideals seems to be incontestable."
For a similar view of the relationship between law and morals, see R.
November, 1967]
sation in situations in which the law's departure from the commun-
ity's sense of justice was very great, evidences the inescapable con-
nection between law and morality. The history of the evolution of
law is largely the history of its reception of doctrines which embody,
to an ever increasing extent, standards of conduct which correspond
to the moral convictions of society. It is to the role played by equity
in the moral growth of the law that this study is directed.
In some legal systems the body of humane doctrine which in
early times corrected the inadequacies of strict law was for long peri-
ods administered as a separate system within the general framework
of the entire legal system. In most parts of the world the two systems
ultimately coalesced, and equity as a separate element of law disap-
peared. For reasons which I have attempted to examine elsewhere,25
this absorption of the principles of equity into the total legal system
did not take place in Anglo-American law. There, equity and law con-
tinued for centuries to flow in separate channels, and were adminis-
tered in separate courts. Beginning about the middle of the 19th
century, in both England and the United States, separate courts of
equity were abolished;26 but by the time this happened, the habit of
confining equitable doctrine to certain well defined areas of law had
taken hold of the judicial mentality too firmly to be easily dislodged.27
We have become in a sense the victims of history, and even though
equity and common law are now administered in a single court, equity
is still treated by us as a separate system. We continue to confine the
application of equitable doctrine largely to suits for specific relief, al-
though the nature of the remedy which is sought or is available has
nothing to do with the relevance of equitable doctrine to substantive
rights. Only imperfectly and sporadically have the principles of equity
permeated into the mainstream of our law. In Roman law praetorian
equity was administered along with the rules of strict law in the same
court;28 but the long experience of administration of equity in a sepa-
rate court in Anglo-American law has allowed the principles of equity
to work themselves pure and has preserved their identity, enabling
them to serve as a catalyst for determining the degree of the humani-
zation of all legal systems.
The difficulty of formulating standards of moral conduct which
can be tested empirically lies at the root of much of the conflict be-
STAMMLER, WIRTSCIAFT UND RECHT 181 (2nd ed. 1905), and MacMillan, Law
and Ethics, 49 ScoT. L. REv. 61, 64 (1933).
25 R. NEWMAN, EQuITy AND LAW: A COmPARATI STUDy ch. 2, at 21
(1961).
26 Id. at 51.
27 "The dual system of law and equity still exists." Boardwell, Equity
and the Law of Property, 20 IowA L. REv. 1, 47 (1934).
28 Praetorian equity began in 356 B.C. and lasted until the reign of
Hadrian. See H. JoLowIcz, supra note 8, at 263.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VoL 19
tween the positivist and naturalist schools of legal philosophy. Even
scientific norms often rest, however, on concepts which are not sus-
ceptible of empirical verification; Bronowski has pointed out that
thought does not survive without symbolic concepts, 29 and Einstein
has said that modern physics would be impossible unless concepts go-
ing beyond observed facts are introduced and tested by their deductive
consequences.3" All truth is susceptible to test, since otherwise we
could not tell what is true. The world of what ought to be, just as the
world of what is, is subject to verification;3 ' but the absence of norms
which can be tested empirically does not impair the validity of postu-
lates in establishing the nature of moral concepts such as reason, jus-
tice and equity. Equity has approached the problem by formulating
standards of conduct with due allowance for variation in exceptional
situations,3 2 refuting Brecht's conclusion that the gulf between the
existential and the normative is unbridgeable.3 3 Such standards con-
stitute adequate guides for decision, and so point the way to justice.3 4
The problem is to formulate norms of conduct which will establish
an equilibrium between law which is just from the viewpoint of the
interests of society as a whole, and law which is just to the individual
-an equilibrium which Saint Thomas called the golden mean of
moral virtue.35
Across the life of the law it is possible to trace the various streams
by which the law has become increasingly humanized. In one of the
earliest civilizations of which we have a written record, Israel, the
concepts of morality were an integral part of the law, as early as the
time of the unknown writer or writers of the Book of Leviticus. 3
Out of Judea came the first plea for human brotherhood, 37 the first
29 J. BRONOWSKI, SCIENcE AND HuAx VALUES 51 (1959).
30 A. EINSTEIN, THE WORLD AS I SEE IT 35 (1935).
31 Cairns, Book Review, 5 NATURAL L.F. 139, 144 (1960).
32 H. CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 463 (1949).
33 B. BRECHT, POLITIcAL THEORY, THE FOUNDATION OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY
THOUGHT 409-13 (1959). Plato takes a view which corresponds to that of
Cairns; one must "accept the best of human arguments, the hardest to refute,
and risk riding on this raft, as it were, in the voyage through life." PLATO,
PHAEDo 85, c, d.
34 The Hebrew word for law, halakha, is derived from a word meaning
literally "to point the way." See Cohn, Prolegomenon to the Theory and
History of Jewish Law, in EssAYs IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 44, 48 (R. New-
man ed. 1962).
35 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II.ii.60.art 2.
36 Luke 10:29 (King James): "Who is thy neighbor?" is asked out of
the context of Leviticus 19:18 (King James): "Thou shalt love thy neighbor
as thyself." See also Leviticus 19:34 (King James).
37 See 1 G. SARTON, THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 63 (1931): "Mosaicarum et
Romanarum Legum Collatis" (attributed to Rufinius, cir. 400 A.D.). This
indicates that "the Roman Empire sought to find the rational validity of its
laws in the roots of a Divine Law-to express in its law the necessity of
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formulation of the moral consciousness of mankind.38 A remarkable
spiritual development which took place from the eighth to the sixth
centuries before the Christian era is most strikingly expressed in the
teachings of Hosea,3 9 Amos 40 and Isaiah.41 A somewhat parallel moral
revival found expression in the theory of natural law of the Greek
Stoics in the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ. When Jewish
law became secularized in the fifth century B.C.,42 the precepts of the
Divine Law remained an integral part of secular law. The vision of
righteousness and human brotherhood of the Prophets of the Old
Testament was carried by Jesus into Christian doctrine as the concept
of charity,43 which found supreme expression in the Sermon on the
human brotherhood through Divine Fatherhood." Benas, Some Jurists and
Humanists, 41 JURiD. REV. 205 (1929).
38 W. DURANT, OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 935 (1954).
30 Hosea 6:6, 10:12, 12:6 (King James).
40 Amos 5:24 (King James).
41 Isaiah 59:14 (King James). See also Leviticus 19:15, 19:18, 19:34
(King James): "Thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye were strangers in
the land of Egypt."
42 In 444 B.C., as related in Nehemiah 10:29 (King James).
43 The rabbinic teaching of love was basic to the teaching of Jesus. J.
OWLE, WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT ch. VII (passim) (1947), cited in F.
SiONE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JUSTICE 30, n.101a (1965). The stream of
Jcwish influence, in which justice and law were inextricably interwoven and
oven identified with each other (See MENDENHALL, LAW AND COVENANT IN
I-RAEL AND THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 16 (1955)), exercised its effect through the
fact that, by the Middle Ages, natural law had been in contact, through Roman
law and apart from Roman law, with the Judeo-Christian moral system.
Paul's concept of charity (1 Corinthians 13 (King James)) meant love and
concern for one's fellow men. See also 4 DUNS ScoTus, Opus OxONIENSE 25.3,
17 (circa 1300). The American Standard Revised version of the Bible trans-
lates a Greek word, which is translated in the King James version as "charity,"
by the word "love." 1 Corinthians 13:13 (King James). The center of
Christian ethics-the triumph of the individual in his renunciation of self-
is stated in Luke 17:33 (King James): "whoever seeks to save his own soul
loses it, and he who loses his soul shall live;" and in John 12:25 (King James):
"he who loves his soul shall lose it, but he who renounces it will assure it
eternal life." The thought receives more exact expression in the French
Bible of Crampton, which uses in a note the Greek word of the text of Luke
17:33 (tcooyovus), "regenerate," "to be born again." See A. GIDE, JOURNALS
1889-1949, at 270, 275 (1947).
Thus the overriding concept of love constituted the contribution to moral
advance, and through the spirit of Christianity, this element of justice per-
vaded all Western thinking. The importance of the doctrine of the Old and
New Testaments in the development of Western thought is referred to by
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1-2, 91, 4. Justice in Biblical law
is expressed in terms of charity in Christian doctrine. "Rabbinic adages con-
stantly encourage working for the welfare of mankind and sacrificing indi-
vidual interests for the sake of peace .... The duties of charity play a
more and more significant role." BONsiRVEN, PALESTINIAN JUDAISM EN THE
TIME OV JESUS CmusT 146 (Wolf transl. 1964). "The figures of Christ and
the Church assume their proper significance only in the light of the divine
realities already present in Palestinian Judaism." Id. at 260. "Judaism, and
primarily the Jewish law, is the bridge between the two testaments." Id. at
252. Bonsirven was a priest of the Jesuit Order (The Society of Jesus).
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Mount.4 4 Although the effect of Christianity in humanizing specific
institutions of post-classical Roman law has been argued,45 it is diffi-
cult to identify any effect of Christian doctrine on the basic moral
principles of Roman law, because by the time of the Christian emper-
ors, its moral doctrines, based on concepts of natural law, had taken
definitive form.46 It may fairly be said that until the Middle Ages
the Judaic-Christian ethic remained isolated from Western jurispru-
dence.47 The 12th and 13th centuries witnessed a revival in Western
Europe of natural law, which during the Dark Ages had lain buried
and forgotten. In the 13th century Saint Thomas combined the funda-
mental ideal of the brotherhood of man-more vast, as Del Vecchio
has pointed out, than the Stoic philosophy 4 8 -, Roman law, the teach-
44 Matthew 5:3-7 (King James); Luke 6:20-49 (King James).
45 "The influence of Christian doctrine is widely revealed in the sense
of a gradual mitigation and humanization of many juridicial institutions; for
example, in promoting a greater concern for good faith, of forbidding the
abuse of rights of property, of favoring the support of charitable foundations,
especially for the relief of poverty, of combating divorce, adultery and ex-
posure of infants to death, and the cruelty of punishments and of gladiatorial
combats." G. DEL VEccmo, LEzioNI DI FILOSOFiA DEL DIRTTO 23 (13th ed. 1965).
See Marchi, Dell' Influence du Christianesimo sulla codificazione giustinianea,
38 STUmi SENSE (vol. XIII, 2d ser.) 61, 100 (1924) (this source was located
at the University of Rome through the courtesy of Professor Del Vecchio).
46 What may have been a direct source of Roman law moral principles
is Codex Justinianus 3.1.8., based on a year 314 decree of Constantine: "Placuit
in omnibus rebus praecipuam esse iustitiae aequitatisque quam stricti iuris
rationem;" cf. CODEX 1.14.1. See also Marchi, supra note 45. The actual ef-
fect of this provision on the subsequent application of the moral doctrines of
Roman law as they had been developed by the end of the classical period,
235 A.D., seems to rest only on conjecture. See generally TROPLONG, DE L'
INFLUENCE DU CHUSTIANISME SUR LE DROIT CIVIL DES ROmAINs 3-67 (1844).
Buckland has remarked that although Justinian's compilers were instructed
to make necessary changes in the material, which was taken from books writ-
ten at least 3 centuries earlier, there was no drastic change of doctrine. Buck-
land, Interpolations in the Digest, 33 YALE L.J. 343, 345 (1924).
47 Durant attributes the obstruction, for a millenium, of the direct inter-
change of Oriental and Occidental ideas, to the fall of Rome and the Moslem
conquest of the routes between Europe and India. W. DuANT, supra note 38,
at 554.
48 "The fundamental ideal of Christianity-the brotherhood of man in
God, is more vast and more elevated than the Greek concept of the Classical
period. The Stoic philosophy was the prelude to Christianity. The influence
of Greek and especially Stoic philosophy gilded to a great extent the doctrine
of Roman jurisprudence through natural law, superimposed on positive law.
In the Middle Ages this concept of natural law was transmitted by the canon-
ists, in the form of the scholastic philosophy of St. Thomas. Thus the essen-
tial elements of classical thought were preserved and found a new life." G.
DEL VECCHIO, supra note 45, at 22.
"Available data authorize the conclusion that from the seventh to the
eleventh century the historical books of the Old Testament constituted the
chief source of the ideas of international law relationships. In the decree of
Gratian even a simple fact of Biblical or ecclesiastical history sometimes
serves as a source of law." Petrazycki, Law and Morality, in 7 TWENTIETH
CENTURY LEGAL PHnLosoprY SErs 283-84 (1955). "[Tihe law existing at
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ings of the Church Fathers (principally those of St. Augustine), natu-
ral law, 49 and institutions of Germanic law,50 closely related to natu-
ral law. The swelling stream of jurisprudence developed by the
scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages, augmented by institu-
tions of the customary law of France, 51 became the source of the civil
law systems of the European continent. In the 13th century the in-
fluence of the Decretal of Gratian, embodying the basic moral doc-
trines of Roman law and Biblical law,5 2 was carried by the Dominican
and Franciscan canonists to England.53 There the canon law pro-
a given time rests upon facts of the remote past ... as normative facts ...
such as statements of the New Testament." Id. at 284. He states that modern
law rests not only on Roman law and contemporary European law, as the
positivists assume, but also has rested, and still rests, for thousands of years
on other sources such as Mohammedan and Hebrew law. Id. at 283. "The
basic and most authoritative normative facts of the development of Christian
law were the sayings of those who had attained lofty religious authority-
that is, on sacral law." Id.
49 L. PETRAZYCKI, supra note 48; P. VINOGRADOFF, ROAN- LAW nv MEDIEVAL
EUROPE 86 (1929); see J. DAwsoN, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE
59, 61, 73 (1958), which refers to the role of Saint Augustine in the fifth cen-
tury.
50 Ehrlich points out that the positive material which was introduced
into natural law by the medievalists was largely taken from German and
French law and institutions of trade. E. EHRLICH, FUNDAzENTAL PmwcIPT s OF
THE SocIoLOGY OF LAW 421 (Moll transl. 1913), cited in F. STONE, supra note
43, at 61. Ehrlich also recognizes "the great transformation ... of the whole
ethical view of life that has been brought about by the Christian religion."
Id. at 459.
51 The revival of jurisprudence in southern France in the latter half of
the llth century was accompanied by the elimination of "anything in the
law contrary to equity." ExcEPTIOES PETRI (Excerpts of Peter; written by
an unknown author); F. SAVIGNY, GESCHICHTE DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS IM
MIlTTELALTER 11, app. I(a) (1834). Vicarius, in his Gloss on the CODE AND
DIGEST, Liber pauperum (12th century), discusses as a major problem the
treatment by the glossators-Inerius, Bulgarus, Azo, Accursius and others-
of the relation between law and equity. Laws must be interpreted in a
humane way so that there should be no discrepancy with equity. Gloss on
the CODE and DIGEST, Summa Trecensis 1.14.6,7 (attributed to Inerius). In
Appendix IV of this Gloss, the author points out the danger in such a wide
power to modify the law on the part of the judge. The Roman views were
transmitted to the courts of customary law through the channels of the
ecclesiastical tribunals. BEAUMANIOR, COUTUMES DE BEAUVAISES §§ 1279-83
(1889-90).
52 In GRATIAN, DECRETUM (circa A.D. 1140), the author declared that the
natural law is what is contained in the lex-the Mosaic law, chiefly the Ten
Commandments, and in the Evangels. "Through the Church there entered
into Europe a patent leaven of Judaic thought. The laws of Moses as well
as the laws of Rome ... " Isaacs, The Common Law of the Bible, 7 A.B.A.J.
117 (1921).
53 In the latter half of the 12th century, Faventinus based the law of
nature on the Stoic-Christian philosophy. FAVENTINUS, SummA ON THE DE-
camum (A.D. 1171). See WILLIM OF LoNGcHAvP, PRACTICA LEGUM ET
DECRETORUM (12th century), a manual of procedure based on civil law and
canon law. Bracton, in LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (circa 1240-1256),
distinguished possession from ownership, contrary to Roman doctrine, and in
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vided the basic doctrines of the legal system which was soon after to
be administered in the Court of Chancery.5 4
The presence of essentially the same fundamental moral princi-
ples in Biblical law, Hindu,55 Zoroastrian,5 6 Chinese 57 and Stoic philos-
ophy, Roman law, canon law, English equity and the civil law systems
throughout the world, lends strong support to the theory, first ad-
vanced by Plato58 and powerfully urged by Del Vecchio,59 that these
principles find their origin in innate impulses of human nature.
Sorokin has remarked that "there have been certain universal and
perennial moral and legal norms that are required to be practiced in
all societies in regard to their members and which are quite necessary
for the maintenance of a good life in any society or individuals. The
main moral commandments of all great religions, of all legal codes,
of all mores and folkways . . . are very similar, often identical." 60
accordance with canon law. He felt that the law of nature was expressed
in the ius gentium. He distinguishes between land and chattels. Obligations
could be created by informal agreement, a theory first developed in the
ecclesiastical courts and in Chancery. Many of the maxims of Roman law
passed through the medium of canon law. See, e.g., Y.B. Mich. 1 Edw. 2, f.
3 (1307), 17 SELDEN SOC'Y 5 (1903); Y.B. TaIN. 1 EDW. 2, f. 2 (1308), 17 SELDEN
Soc'y 186 (1903); Y.B. Mich. 3 Edw. 2, f. 15 (1309), 19 SELDEN Soc'y 110 (1904);
Y.B. Hil. 3 Edw. 2, f. 9b (1310), 19 SELDEN Soc'Y 176 (1904). The maxims were
sometimes modified so as to bring them into accord with current conditions.
WILLiAm OF LONrcHAmp, supra, pointed out that a claim might be stated
in general expression. "Next to the Bible, no book has left a deeper mark
upon the history of mankind than the Corpus Iuris Civilis." D'ENTREVES,
NATURAL LAw 17 (1951).
54 See Coing, English Equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the Canon
Law, 71 L.Q. REV. 223 (1955). "The canon law had borrowed its form, its
language, its spirit, and many a maxim from the civil law." 1 F. POLLOCK &
F. MAITLAmND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 116 (2d ed. 1898). See also P.
WINFIELD, THE CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HIsToRY 57 (1925). Thayer
has observed that "while the other nations of Western Europe were beginning
to adopt as their own the ultimate results of Roman legal history, England
was unconsciously reproducing their history." J.B. THAYER, The Teaching
of the English Law at Universities, in LEGAL ESSAYS 378 (1908).
55 The Golden Rule in the Hindu religion: "Do naught to others which
if done to thee would cause thee pain." VENKATESWARA 1517, cited in MONzIEa-
WILLIAMS, INDIAN WISDOm 448 (1893).
56 J. DAwsON, THE ETHICAL RELIGION OF ZOROASTER 125 (1931): "The
golden rule; that nature alone is good which shall not do unto another what-
ever is not good unto its own self."
57 The golden rule of Confucianism is: "Not to do unto others as' you
would not wish done to yourself." ANALECTS XU.ii.
58 PLATO, WORKS *294 (Jowett transl. 1937).
59 Del Vecchio, Les bases du droit comparg et les principes generaux
du droit, 12 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT CoiwVPARE 493 (1960); G. DEL
VEccmo, Sur le Pr~tendu caractare politique du droit, HUmANiTE ET UNITE
Du Daorr-EssAMES DE PHILOsOPHIE JURIDIQUE 93 (1963): "Law is born natur-
ally in the human spirit."
60 P. SOROKIN, THE BASIC TRENDS OF OUR TnviEs 149, 150 (1964). "Most
of the equitable or discretionary ingredients which are constantly found in
legal systems are inherent in the average moral sense of the community." C.
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As we retrace the history of the law we come upon various terms in
which these basic concepts have been expressed through the ages:
the concept of righteousness of Biblical6' and Hindu0 2 law, the ideal
of clemency of Greek 3 and Chinese64 law, the Hebraic ideal of the
brotherhood of men which found expression in Christianity as the
concept of charity,6 5 the concept of conscience of canon law and
equity,66 the concepts of reason, equity and natural justice which ap-
pear in many civil law codes,6 7 and the concept of justice in the cur-
rent draft of the Restatement of Contracts of the American Law Insti-
tute.68 None of these terms, nor their aggregate effect, express the
ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 405 (6th ed. 1958). "The laws of every people
... are partly common to.itself, partly common to all mankind." GArus 1.1.
"The justice of mankind at large ... is rooted in the social union of the race
of man." CICERO, TuscuLAN DISPUTATIONS I.xxv.64. Cf. Wen Tien Scien,
Song of Rectitude, in THE HISTORY OF THE SuNG DYNASTY (Tien Shan Wang
transl.) (unpublished manuscript by Tien Shan Wang, Berkeley, California),
a compilation made under the direction of Toto, Prime Minister of the Yuan
Dynasty, A.D. 418:
The earth is kept up, and the sky supported
By the benign spirit of righteousness;
So are the fate and the destiny of man
And the foundation of the moral law.
Confucius (died 551 B.C.) said that the goal of mankind was to attain
benevolence; Mencius (4th cent. B.C.) said that the goal of mankind was
to choose righteousness. Mencius insisted on the innate goodness of human
nature. See CHU CI, THE SACRED Booxs OF CONFUCIUS 95, 355 (1965).
61 Isaiah 59:14 (King James) expresses such a concept, according to
ISAIAH, SoNciNo Booxs OF THE BIBLE 290 (1949).
62 Dharma signified righteousness in Hindu jurisprudence; see M. SETHNA,
JURISPRUDENCE 57 (1959).
63 ARISTOTLE, NIcOMAcHEAN ETmcs Bk. 5, ch. 10. The Greek word
"epieikeia" means literally "clemency."
64 Tsao, Equity in Chinese Customary Law, in EssAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE
IN HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND 21, 32 (R. Newman ed. 1962).65 See note 43 supra.
66 Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 106 (1908); Vinogradoff,
Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth Century Jurisprudence, 24 L.Q. REV. 373,
379 (1908).
67 E.g., CODE CIrVI SUISSE art. 4 (Switz. Payot 1937) [hereinafter cited
as Swiss CIVIL CODE]; CODE DES OBLIGATIONS art. 24 (Switz. Payot 1937)
[hereinafter cited as SwIss CODE OF OBLIGArTIONS]; CODE CIVL E arts. 565, 1135
(Fr. 63e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1964) [hereinafter cited as FRENCH Civr.
CODE]; BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH §§ 315-19 (Ger. 22d ed. Palandt 1963) [here-
inafter cited as GERMAN CrVIL CODE]; UNIFORM SCANDINAVIAN CODE art. 33;
CODIcE CIVIL art. 12 (Italy 1948), [hereinafter cited as ITALIAN CrVn CODE].
68 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 358-80 (1932) incorporate the equitable
test of good conduct, and undue hardship, applied in actions for specific per-
formance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89D (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965):
"A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on
either side is binding
"(a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not
anticipated when the contract was made; or
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total scope of conduct which has been approved in the course of legal
history throughout the world as equitable. If the nature of the
ethical content of equity can be more clearly defined, the principles
of equity could become an effective link between legal systems, a step
toward the creation of a common law of mankind.6 9
Before we attempt to describe more specifically the basic concepts
of equity which have been identified in the Anglo-American experi-
ence and which are implicit although less clearly discernible in most
civil law systems, it seems desirable to exclude some doctrines which
are commonly regarded as equitable in nature but are not so in re-
ality. In Anglo-American law a sharp distinction is drawn between
relief from ordinary hardship, which falls within the province of
common law actions for damages, and relief from extreme hardship,
for which relief is available in suits in equity for specific relief. The
doctrine of relief from extreme hardship is not, however, an exclu-
sively equitable doctrine, since this doctrine applies to all legal norms,
including those which are relevant in actions for damages. In Anglo-
American law the standards of virtuous conduct which are found in
equity are ordinarily applied only in the exceptional situations of ex-
treme hardship to the victim of the unconscionable conduct. This
limitation of the doctrines of pure equity arises out of the historical
confinement of equitable relief to cases in which the courts of common
law afforded no remedy, or no remedy which was adequate. The limi-
tation to extreme hardship is the result of distinctions as to the juris-
diction of the courts of equity and the courts of common law, and not
of distinctions based on any thought that the principles of equity
were less appropriate to the determination of the rights of the parties
in cases of ordinary hardship. The limitation of equitable relief to
cases of extreme hardship precludes the use of equitable doctrine in a
large area of legal controversies. No such distinction exists in any
other system. The limitation of equitable relief to cases of extreme
"(c) to the extent that justice requires enforcement in view of material
change of position in reliance on the prorhise."
If the modification is fair and equitable,'why should not the court be
allowed to make the modification even though the promisee is unwilling to
permit it? Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 78 (1950); Fuller, The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 401-06 (1936) (second, installment);
Boyer, Promissory Estoppel,- 50 McH. L. REv. 639, 873 .(1952) (second in-
stallment); Annot., 115 A.L.R. 152, (1938), supplemented by 48 A.L.R.2d 1069
(1956).
If a contract or any clause.is found- to be' unconscionable, the court may
refuse to enforce the contract or may strike any unconscionable clauses and
enforce the contract as if the stricken- dlause 'had .never existed. UNIFORM
COIMMiVERCIAL CODE §-2-302 (1962). See-Note, Unconscionability in Sales Con-
tracts, 63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954).,69 "Avant de parler d'unification; i est necessaire de coordinner entre
eux les syst~mes existants' Sarfatti, Le droit rcpmparg en fonction de T'
unification du droit, 3 REVuE INTERNATIONAL DE DRorr COMPARE 69, 71 (1951).
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hardship was introduced into English equity, on the basis of canon
law doctrine, only for reasons of expediency.70 It has no relation to
the question of whether or not equitable doctrine is relevant, but
only to the availablity of equitable remedies. Hardship alone-ordi-
nary hardship-should be enough to bring into play the principles and
remedies of equity. There is evidence of a tendency in this direction
in Anglo-American law.7 1 Nor is the principle that relief should be
moulded according to the facts of each case a fundamental concept
peculiar to equity. This principle manifests itself more prominently
in equity because the application of the substantive principles of
equity, based on moral doctrines, often makes the rules of strict law
inapplicable and, since moral problems are never the same, requires
that attention be given to the particular facts of each case to a greater
degree than is ordinarily required in the application of the norms of
strict law; but the principle that legal norms should be applied with
reference to the facts of the particular case is common to all legal
controversies. Finally, the doctrine of enforcement in personam
is not an essential element of equity since this limitation on equitable
remedies in Anglo-American law also grew out of a desire to avoid
interference with the jurisdiction of the established common law
courts at the time when the Court of Chancery was established. In
the civil law there is no enforcement in personam, except in rare
instances in German law, although the doctrines of equity and the
specific enforcement of rights by other means than enforcement in
personam are much more widely applied than in Anglo-American
law.
It is obvious that not all moral principles which are to be found
in the law fall within the exclusive province of equity.72  With the
progressive humanization of the law, we can no longer properl-
speak of strict law as law without morality, but there are still wide
areas in the total jurisprudence of all legal systems in which the
moral standards which have become clearly identified in Anglo-
American equity have not been completely accepted. The distinction
is not so much between law and morals as between the moral stand-
ards of legal norms in which the equitable standards have not been
70 This was primarily to avoid conflicts of jurisdiction with the estab-
lished courts; see R. NEwmAN, EQUmT AND LAW: A Com ARA-= STUDy 29
(1961).
71 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 169 (Michie 1966); Uxrroum COm-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-716 (1962); UmFoRm SALES ACT § 68 (1946 version);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 944 (1939).
72 Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 671 (Ch. 1818). "There is no exact
and well-defined line separating the moral and the legal fields." Corbin,
Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501, 505 (1924). Examples of the reception
of moral doctrine at common law are the doctrine that agreements must
be kept, and the recognition of rights of personality, protected usually by
injunctive relief.
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completely absorbed, and the moral standards of legal norms in which
complete absorption has taken place. What we must compare is law-
without-equity and law-with-equity. The nature of the moral content
of equity can best be ascertained by distinguishing between the moral
standards of equity and the moral standards of the rest of the law. In
the civil law the comparison is difficult because the prominence of the
code provisions, into which the concepts of equity have been com-
pletely integrated, tends to obscure the extent to which those concepts
actually have been applied by the courts, and the existence of areas in
which those concepts have been applied only imperfectly. In the
Anglo-American legal system the difference between the moral
standards of equity and of the common law are much more easily
discernible.
When we compare the moral content of the principles of equity
which have become clearly identified in Anglo-American equity, with
the moral content of other legal norms, we find two different levels
of moral standards. At one level are standards of conduct in which
the social order, as contrasted with what Stammler has called the
social interest in the individual life,7 3 is of predominating importance,
since without them life in an orderly society would hardly be possible,
or could proceed only with difficulty.7 4 Jellinek said nearly a century
ago that law is the part of morals which has to do with the indispen-
sable conditions of the social order.7 5 Among these basic standards of
virtuous conduct which fall within the province of law are the duty
to respect the inviolability of person and property by refraining from
causing harm intentionally or through failure to exercise due care in
one's conduct or in the control of one's property, the duty to make
good any harm caused intentionally or through failure to exercise due
care in one's conduct or in the control of one's property, and the duty
to make good any failure to carry out obligations voluntarily under-
taken with full awareness of their consequences.
In these legal norms the concepts of equity have in most cases
only minimal importance, and the urgent social need for universal
application of the norms ordinarily precludes their modification on
equitable grounds. We attribute to conduct conforming with these
basic postulates of civilized life the quality of what is fair and just,
because such conduct is reasonably to be expected if men are to live
comfortably and to work successfully together in a crowded world.
Such standards of conduct comprise what Jellinek called a minimum
73 R. STAvMLER, LEHRE voN DEM RECHTIGE14 REcHTs 208 (1919).
74 "Without justice, life would not be possible, and, even if it were, it
would not be worth while." G. DEL VEccnlo, JusTicE 177 (1956).
75 G. JELLINEK, DIE SOZIALETHISCHE BEDEUTUNG voN RECHT, UNRECHT UND
STRAFE ch. II (1878). Jellinek calls the excess "an ethical luxury"; but this
is what equity actually supplies to the law. - -
November, 1967] THE HIDDEN EQUITY
ethic-standards to which, as he said, we may expect to give effect
through legal precepts. Radbruch, refusing to concede that law is
limited in all its norms to a minimum ethic, drew a distinction be-
tween different moral levels which exist within legal systems. He
refers to these levels as standards of higher or lesser importance 76-a
division of moral standards which differs from Jellinek's classification,
since it distinguishes between moral levels not on the basis of whether
or not they incorporate legally enforceable standards, but within the
general category of enforceable norms. This brings us closer than
Jellinek has done to the distinction between the moral standards of
equitable norms and the moral standards of norms of strict law.
Pound, recognizing, as does Radbruch, different levels of morality
within the legal order, explains the distinction on practical grounds
not confined, as Jellinek felt was the case, to problems of enforce-
ment. So long, Pound says, as legal precepts which are at variance
with the requirements of morals are more than historical anomalies
that ought to be pruned away, they arise from practical limitations
on effective legal action which make it inexpedient in a wise social
engineering to attempt to secure certain claims or enforce certain
duties to an extent that might from a purely ethical standpoint be
desirable.77
As long as the restraints on the adoption of moral principles arise
because of problems of enforcement, the limitation of the application
of moral principles in law is unavoidable, and must be tested from
time to time by a continuous scrutiny of the consensus of society on
moral questions. As society raises its moral sights, so must the law.
The parallelism between the dynamic of social progress in morality
and the moral growth of law is confirmed by history. We cannot, if
law is to continue to perform its function of aiding in the attain-
ment of social goals-the engineering function of which Pound speaks
-allow the moral standards of legal norms to lag behind the ac-
cepted moral standards of the community enforceable through legal
sanctions. It has been said that the force of law rests on its conform-
ity with ethical postulates.78 As Kohler has observed, "jurisprudence
must appreciate the ideal ends toward which society strives.179 It
would be unfortunate if the law, the most effective of all institutions
for social control, were to fail to play a leading role in the grand
march of mankind toward the goal of human brotherhood. Sorokin
76 G. RADBRUCH, EINFUHRUNG iN DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 11-12 (9th ed.
1952).
77 R. POUND, LAW AND MoRLs 24 (1924). H. BERGSON, THE Two SOURCES
of MoRALIrY AND RELIGION 58 (17th ed. 1956) makes a somewhat similar
distinction between social solidarity and absolute justice.
78 H. COING, GRUNDZUGE DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 18 (1947).
79 J. KOHLER, LEHRBUCH DER RECHTPHILOSOPHIE 32 (3rd ed. 1923).
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has said that a minimum of love is absolutely necessary for the contin-
uing existence of any society, and especially for a harmonious social
order and for creative progress.8 0 Altruistic love, in his opinion,
"means the specific behavior of living forms striving . . . to be help-
ful to other organisms."8' "Societies are held together ... by a wide-
spread faith in the other fellow's decency."8 2 The most important
social phenomenon of our age is the increasing re-cognition of the
eternal postulate of human brotherhood.
Sorokin's theory of legal morality leads us to a second level of
moral standards which is less essential to social order than the stand-
ards which are to be found at the first moral level, but which must
be incorporated into legal standards unless our moral values are to be
divorced from actual relations of men with one another. It is at this
second level that concepts of pure equity are to be found. Since the
time of Plato,-philosophers have remarked on the difficulty of defining
virtue. Plato said that "if one finds by inspiration a reason for virtue
agreeable to truth, he will be as a living man among flitting shades."83
Confucius described virtuous conduct as that which is based on reci-
procity. 4 In Chinese customary law insistence upon one's rights was
considered bad taste. 5 In French law virtuous conduct is described
as assuring by "rules of the game" the good faith of the contract.88 It
has been said that "reality is never so clear-cut in its differences as the
rubrics under which we dismember it for neat handling.8 T7 This leads
to difficulty in formulating legal norms in which moral standards
which are felt to be within the province of legal enforcement are to
be expressed.
One of the world's foremost philosophers has remarked that pri-
vate law has developed through a slow but continuous process of
abstraction and generalization, representing the solutions worked out
in individual cases. The decisions, initially based on the circum-
stances of each case and on an evaluation of the immediate interests
in dispute, are gradually replaced by propositions based on concepts
which enable them to be presented as the result of logical analysis.88
In the beginning was the "case." But every decision of a special
80 p. SORoKiN, THE BASIC TRENDS or OuR Tnms 149 (1964).
81 Id. at 154.
82 A. HUxLEY, THE PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY 241 (1963).
83 PLATO, MENON (Mv6iv) 99-100 (transl. by the present writer).
84 ANALECTS XII, ii.
85 Padoux, Preface to LEANG KI-TCHAO, LA CONCEPTION DE LE LOI ET DES
THEORIES DES LEGISTISTES A LA VEILLE DES Tsin (1926), quoted in J. WIGMOE,
EVIDENCE 144 (library ed. 1928).
86 G. R PERT, LA REGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS civEs No. 40 (4th
ed. 1949).
87 W. DURANT, OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 290 (1935).
88 Puig Brutau, Realism in Comparative Law, 3 AM. J. CoUP. L. 42
(1954).
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case is given in the conviction and with the intention that, should
the case recur, it will be decided in the same way. Now it is impos-
sible that every new case should coincide with the old in all its de-
tails, so that every decision implies not only that the one case is de-
cided, but also that an abstract principle is evolved from the case
itself by a process of abstraction in which certain special circum-
stances of the case are ignored. A further step, often more than one,
is needed before this abstract result can be formulated in words.8 9
In deciding a case the judge does not approach de novo the prob-
lem presented by the facts before him. He takes into consideration
the rules which have been developed to solve similar although never
identical problems; but in selecting the rule to apply to the new case
he determines the relevancy or applicability of the rule on the basis
of the purposes the rule was designed to serve. He finds these pur-
poses among a body of fundamental principles, usually few in number,
and sometimes in even more basic concepts upon which the funda-
mental principles rest. These concepts and principles express the
economic, social, political and moral interests which the law serves.
The reason why one rule is to be chosen rather than another is found
in the interests which the various rules have been designed to satisfy.
To find the meaning of a rule of law we must look at its purpose.
When the purpose of the rule is understood, its relevance or lack of
relevance to the case before the court becomes clear. Individual jus-
tice does not necessitate the abandonment of rules of law; there are
rules for guidance to the decision of almost all cases. The underlying
principles, and the concepts upon which they are based, help the
judge to choose between alternative rules of application, or to create
a new rule if none of the established rules provides a satisfactory
solution.
Over the centuries there have evolved in Anglo-American equity
six basic principles which are the distillation of the moral experience
developed in the Judaic-Christian ethos, classical philosophy, Roman
law9" and other sources of modem law.91 These principles can be
succinctly stated. Rights should be based on substance instead of
form. The law will not permit the unscrupulous to carry out their
plans. Fully intended agreements made with complete awareness
of their possible consequences should be carried out specifically, if
this is practicable and does not conflict with controlling social or indi-
vidual interests. Agreements made by mistake should not be en-
forced unless failure to do so would have unfair effects. Benefits
obtained by accident or mistake should be relinquished to those who
are better entitled to them, or restitution made. The burdens of mis-
89 F. SCHULZ, PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW 40 (1936).
90 Mainly in the last title, Title 50 of the DIGEST, which was compiled
some 300 years after their formulation in the classic period of Roman law.
91 See note 50, supra.
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fortune arising out of human relationships should be fairly distrib-
uted between the persons involved, and if necessary among the mem-
bers of the community. Since these principles are the expression in
law of moral precepts, it should help us to understand how the prin-
ciples are to be applied if we think about them in terms of the moral
precepts upon which the principles are based.
I think that in searching for the nature of equity we would do
well to acknowledge its moral origin; and that to fully understand the
function of the principles of equity we must look at the nature and
purpose of the moral doctrines from which they have been derived.
It seems not unlikely that the failure to establish a cohesive system
of equity is due to the fact that the fundamental concepts cannot be
classified according to the conventional division of law into branches
such as contracts, quasi contracts, property and torts. I suggest that
any workable system of equity must rest on a classification of rights
and obligations according to concepts which have already received
well-recognized interpretation in systems of ethics and morals. Jus-
tice, in a trenchant phrase of Del Vecchio, is the legal profile of
ethics.92 Much labor and thought will be needed, as Percy Bordwell
remarked more than 30 years ago, to have a well-knit, harmonious
system of law and equity.9 3 A glance at any equity casebook brings
to mind McDougal's comment, "Equity. What useful purpose is
served by putting this rag-bag of stuff between two covers?" 94 Even
Hanbury, clinging compulsively to the dual system of law and equity,
was obliged to confess that "the truth is that equity is still a miscel-
lany, made up of various doctrines which sometimes seem mutually
almost unrelated."95 When we reduce the principles of equity to their
basic elements, we find that those principles, and nearly all the rules
92 G. DEL VECCHiO, Sur les conditions d' une vraie paix, in HUMAiTE ET
UNnTE DlU DROiT-EssAIES DE PHILOSOPMrE JutjaIQua 262 (1963).
93 Bordwell, Equity and the Law of Property, 20 IowA L. REV. 1, 46 (1934).
94 Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy, 52 YALE.
L.J. 203, 255 (1943) (previously cited note 4 supra).
95 H. HANBuRY, EssAYs n EQuITY 23 (1934). The prevailing uncertainty
as to the nature of equity is reflected and perpetuated by the way equity is
dealt with in the law school curriculum. Where separate courses in equity
are still given, they consist of a heterogeneous collection of material, much
of which fits more properly into courses in property, contracts, torts, resti-
tution or procedure. The harm in this method of teaching equity is, apart
from a possible waste of curricular hours, that the heterogeneity of subject
matter obscures the substantive elements. The alternative method of elimi-
nating the separate course in equity has led to the loss of even casual attention
to the substantive elements of equity and sometimes, by reason of inadequate
understanding of the substantive elements, to only oblique reference to equit-
able remedies. The latter difficulty is avoided in many law schools by intro-
ducing a separate course in remedies. What seems to be lacking in any of
these methods of instruction in equity is a thorough examination of substan-
tive doctrine. This, it would seem, can be supplied by a one semester, 2-
hour course, early in the curriculum, devoted to the substantive doctrines.
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in which they have been applied-that is to say, nearly all equitable
doctrine-rest upon the moral concepts of good faith,96 honesty97 and
generosity. 98 These concepts, embodying the ideal of decent and
honorable conduct, provide, when applied to jurisprudence, the legal
counterparts of the precepts which express the ethical and moral ex-
perience of mankind. It is undoubtedly true that the descriptions of
moral conduct in legal norms are not precise equivalents of the moral
standards, since what are standards of voluntary conduct in ethics
and morals, enforced only by public opinion or the individual con-
science, become in law obligations subject to penalties for their viola-
tion. This may account for the absence of more precise terms in
which to describe the corresponding legal concepts; yet, to para-
phrase a remark of the late Judge Charles E. Clark, though the edges
may be indefinite, their solid central core has been so often defined
as to make their meaning indisputable.
Good Faith
The requirement of good faith originated in contractual or fidu-
ciary obligations,99 but it seems analytically desirable and sound to
apply the concept not only to contracts and fiduciary relationships
but to all violations of confidence and even to obligations to strangers.
The difference between ordinary good faith and equitable standards
of good faith is well understood in Anglo-American law. The require-
ment of good faith at common law is largely confined, except in fidu-
96 Radin has pointed out that the expression "bona fidei contractus"
occurs in CODEx 4.54.9, 4.58.5. Radin, The Roman Law of Quasi-Contract,
23 VA. L. REV. 241, n.250 (1936).
97 The expression "honeste vivere" appears in DIGEST 1.1.1.3. The term
"unselfishness," to describe much the same concept as "honesty," was used
by Finieux, arguendo, in Y.B. Hil. 4 Hen. VII, f. 5, pl 8 (1597).
98 Cicero defined justice as that sentiment which maintains human
solidarity with generosity and equity. CICERO, DE FINBUS V., 65. Leibniz,
quoted by G. MOLLAT in MITTHEILUNGEN AUS LIEBNIZENS UNGEDRUCKTEN SCHRF-
TEN 14 (1887), said: "The active social participation and cooperation in
furthering individual purposes demand of the individual a voluntary re-
nunciation of the advantages that arise from separation and isolation." Kent
speaks of "the obligation to deal candidly and benevolently with each other
co-tenant." 4 KENT, COMMENTARIES *371 n.(c). "Finally, private persons
are said to show equity to one another, when out of the law of humanity or
beneficence, they make a present of what they could exact by the force of
civil laws, or else give up something of their right." 2 S. PuFENDoRF, Tus
ELEMENTS OF UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE 164 (W. Oldfather transl. 1931) (first
published in 1660). Descartes felt that generosity is the basic moral concept.
See P. MESNARD, DESCARTES 76 (1966).
99 The ethical concept of morality was taken over into Roman law
as the duty of good faith according to the nature of one's undertaking. Cf.
4 GAiUs, ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW § 62; INSTITUTES 4.6.33; R. POUND, LAw
AND MORALS 7 (1924). "Common Law and equity ... originally looked on
fraud ... as a failure in the performance of a special contractual or fiduciary
duty." H. HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY 678 (6th ed. 1952).
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ciary and confidential relationships and in a few types of contracts, to
responsibility for affirmative representations of fact. Parsons, writ-
ing in 1857, said that a seller may let a buyer cheat himself ad libitum
but must not actively assist him to so do.100 The statement is still
largely true in sales of real property,101 and we retain in the law of
sales of personal property the doctrine of "dealers' talk."' 02 The
dealer talks, of course, so that his statements will be relied upon; but
even in the face of the doctrine that negligence is not a defense
against misrepresentations of fact intentionally made, the doctrine of
dealers' talk is allowed to weigh heavily against gullible purchasers.
The equitable standard of good faith requires putting one's cards on
the table; it forbids overreaching by any form of cunning,10 3 includ-
ing failure to disclose. 0 4 In equity, cheating is as reprehensible as it
100 1 T. PARSONS, CONTRACTS 461 (3d ed. 1857).
101 See, e.g., Hendrick v. Lynn, 37 Del. Ch. 402, 406, 144 A.2d 147, 150
(Ch. 1958); Fegeas v. Sherrill, 218 Md. 472, 147 A.2d 223 (1958); Swinton v.
Whitinsville Say. Bank, 311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808 (1942).
"It is unfortunate that when we turn to the sale or lease of real property
we find that the standard is so low that no decent man would accept it as a
guide." A. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 119 (1955). In
English law "Etlhere is no duty to disclose that a field offered for sale has
been sprayed with a poison deadly to animals . . . or to warn a prospective
tenant that a house contains a boiler likely to explode .... ." This gap,
Goodhart adds, "is recognized by almost everyone who is not a lawyer." Id.
at 120.
102 See J. DAwsoN & G. PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTION 268 (1958).
103 As early as the eighth century B.C., Hosea said: "He is a merchant,
the balances of deceit are in his hands; he loveth to oppress." Hosea 12:7
(King James). Cyrus said in the sixth century B.C. that the Greek market
was a place where men might cheat one another under oath; see H. MULLER,
THE Loom OF HISTORY (1958). Examples of modern perpetuation of such
standards are: inducing a person to refrain from taking precautions in
reliance on the integrity of his adversary, Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46,
85 N.E. 839 (1908); Brooks v. Conston, 364 Pa. 256, 72 A.2d 75 (1950); taking
advantage of information imparted in confidence, Tyler v. Tyler, 54 R.I. 254,
172 A. 820 (1934); benefitting from laches, Talmash v. Mugleston, 4 L.J. Ch.
200 (1826); or by the creation, even as against a stranger, of deceptive ap-
pearances, the basis of the doctrine of estoppel, Maple v. Kussart, 54 Pa. 348
(1866). Equitable standards of good faith are applied even in actions for
damages in some types of contracts and relationships; for example, contracts
of insurance, American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937); see
Wilcox, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Concealment in Insurance Law, 9
TuL. L. REV. 449 (1935) and in relations of suretyship, see Dering v. Earl of
Winchelsea, 29 Eng. Rep. 1184 (Ch. 1787); Sterling v. Burdett, [1911] 2 Ch.
418; see A. STEARNs, SuRETysmn 477-99, 508 (3d ed. 1922). Similarly, in prop-
erty settlements between husband and wife, see Estate of Cover, 188 Cal. 133,
204 P. 583 (1922).
104 Wollums v. Horsley, 93 Ky. 582, 20 S.W. 781 (1892) (failure to disclose
the probability that a railroad would be built nearby in the near future);
Hesse v. Briant, 43 Eng. Rep. 1375 (Ch. 1856); Clauser v. Taylor, 44 Cal. App.
2d 453, 112 P.2d 661 (1941) (failure to disclose that property to be sold had
been filled in). See Cohen v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 143 Cal.
App. 2d 480, 300 P.2d 14 (1956); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 472(b) (1932);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 551.1 (1938); W. PROSSER, TORTS 701, 710 (3d ed. 1964).
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is in morals, without regard to the way the cheating is done. Good
faith forbids exacting a hard bargain. 0 5 The bargaining process as
looked upon in equity must be a transaction between persons who
are aware of all material facts and neither of whom need bargain
under the pressure of controlling economic compulsion exerted by his
adversary, 0 6 even though such compulsion does not amount to the
common law concepts of duress or undue influence, which are found
at the first moral level. Good faith extends to obligations to strangers,
for example to relations between co-owners of property'0 7 and rela-
tions of suretyship'01 which arise without consensual agreement; to
situations which give rise to estoppel' 09 or laches;" 0 and to cases in
which property has been acquired with knowledge of rights of third
persons having equities superior to the rights of the transferor, such
as where the immediate transferee obtained the property by fraud,"'
or where the transfer was in fraud of creditors" 2 or in violation of a
trust.
1 3
Ripert has used the striking phrase "the moralization of contracts" to describe
this duty. G. RIPERT, LA REGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES 92, 93
(2d ed. 1927).
105 P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 47 (1965). See McCluer v.
Super Maid Cook-Ware Corp., 62 F.2d 426, 429 (10th Cir. 1932); Streich v.
General Motors Corp., 5 Ill. App. 2d 458, 126 N.E.2d 389 (1955); State Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961); Bekken
v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc'y, 70 N.D. 122, 143, 293 N.W. 200, 212 (1940); Hen-
ningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (disclaimer
of implied warranty of fitness of a new car); Portion Pace, Inc. v. Bond, 44
Wash. 2d 161, 265 P.2d 1045 (1954); Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair
Exchange, 11 TuL. L. REV. 345 (1937). In German law a price-value dif-
ferential of at least one-half is utilized as a measure of unconscionableness.
GERMAN CIVIL CODE § 138. Cornblith v. Valentine, 211 Cal. 243, 294 P.
1065 (1930) (dictum). "If a contract or any clause is found to be unconscion-
able, the court may refuse to enforce the contract or may strike any
unconscionable clauses and enforce the contract as if the stricken clause
had never existed." UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302. See generally Note,
Unconscionability in Sales Contracts, 63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954).
106 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1575: "Undue influence consists: 1. In the
use, by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another, or who holds a real
or apparent authority over him, of such confidence or authority for the purpose
of obtaining an unfair advantage over him .... .
107 See, e.g., Clausel v. Riley, 188 Miss. 647, 196 So. 245 (1940) (co-tenant
cannot purchase an adverse interest); Dolan v. Cummings, 116 App. Div.
787, 102 N.Y.S. 91 (1907); J. WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY 481 (17th ed. 1894).
108 Pickersgill v. London & Provincial Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., [19121
3 K.B. 614, 621; Sterling v. Burdett, [1911] 2 Ch. 418; Dering v. Earl of
Winchelsea, 29 Eng. Rep. 1184 (Ch. 1787). See Mandeville v. Solomon, 39
Cal. 125 (1870); Robinson v. Bledsoe, 23 Cal. App. 687, 139 P. 245 (1914); A.
STEARNS, SuRETYsHIP 477-99, 508 (3d ed. 1922).
109 See, e.g., Jones v. Gibbon, 155 Eng. Rep. 1626 (Ex. 1853) (estoppel to
insist on prompt performance).
110 Groesbeck v. Morgan, 206 N.Y. 385, 99 N.E. 1046 (1912).
11 Higgins v. Lodge, 68 Md. 229, 11 A. 846 (1888).
112 J. DAwsoN & G. PALMER supra note 102, at 67 n.21.
"3 E.g., Otis v. Otis, 167 Mass. 245, 45 N.E. 737 (1897); see R. NEwMAN,
TRusTs 269 (2d ed. 1955).
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The equitable standard of good faith applies not only to the for-
mation of contracts but also to their performance. The promise must
be kept not merely by making compensation in damages for its
breach, an obligation which falls at the first moral level, but, where-
ever practicable,114 and where the result would not conflict with the
interests of the community," 5 specifically. 116 In the civil law the
right to specific enforcement, called natural reparation, is primary,117
the obligation being enforced by the closest approximation to personal
performance by the defendant. The common law is more insistent
than the civil law on implementing the defendant's obligation of spe-
cific performance, which is done by imprisonment for contempt. The
civil law goes far beyond the common law, however, in enforcing obli-
gations by natural reparation, which is done by permitting the plain-
tiff, or an officer appointed by the court, to carry out the defendant's
obligation specifically, at the defendant's expense."8  The course of
dealings which has just been described is in accordance with the code
of fair play of everyday ethics, 1 9 is written into the civil codes of
almost all civil law systems,'120 and is thoroughly established in Anglo-
American equity as well as in actions for damages in some branches
of Anglo-American law. In most actions for damages, however, the
114 See Beck v. Allison, 56 N.Y. 366 (1874).
115 Rockhill Tennis v. Volker, 331 Mo. 947, 56 S.W.2d 9 (1932).
116 See R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHLosoPHY or LAW 135 (1921),
where he comments on "the introduction into the civil law of the actio ad im-
plemendur of Roman Law, requiring performance, with natural execution,
that is, a doing by the court or its officers at the expense of the defendant,
of that to which he is bound as ascertained by the judgment." See also
PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITE PRACTIQUE DU DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS No. 780 (1931);
Judgment of June 4, 1924 (Cass Civ.) [1927] D.H. Jur. 1:136 (note Josserand),
[1925] S. Jur. III 1:97 (note Huguenay).
The common law distinguishes between redress in damages and redress
by specific performance, assigning to the equitable jurisdiction the exclusive
authority to order specific performance and to the common law the authority,
although not exclusive, to require damages. The foregoing distinction is
the basis of Holmes' statement that a contractual obligation is to pay damages
if the contract is not carried out. The distinction is explained in Letter from
Oliver W. Holmes to Sir Frederick Pollock, Dec. 11, 1908, in 2 HOLMEs-
POLLOCK LETTERS 233 (M. Howe ed. 1942).
117 See Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARv. L. REV. 641, 650
(1923).
118 [1899] D.P. I1 1:445. Plaintiff was authorized to tear down, at de-
fendant's expense, a wall which obstructed plaintiff's easement over the
defendant's property.
119 2 P. OERTMANN, MOTIVES TO THE DRAFT TO THE GERMAN CivL CODE 727:
"What sort of morals is it according to which the judges are asked to de-
cide? . . . [S]ome sort of general 'everyday' ethics-those ethics which are
actually practiced in life; the 'moral feeling of the average citizen.'"
120 E.g., GERMAN CIVL CODE § 157; SwIss CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 21;
OESTERREICHIScHE GESETZBUcH art. 879 (Austria 25th ed. Kapber 1955); POLIsH
CIVIL CODE art. 42; ScANDINAVIAN CivLr CODE art. 31; RussIAX CIVIL CODE &
CODE OF COMMERcE art. 33; FRENCH.Civm CODE art 1134.
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rights of the parties are determined without reference to the norms of
pure equity.
Honesty
The equitable concept of honesty is relevant whenever benefits
have been obtained gratuitously, in bad faith, or by accident or mis-
take under circumstances in which the acquirer would be unjustly
enriched at another person's expense if the acquirer were permitted
to retain the benefits. It is to be noted that the concept of honesty
does not explain all cases of unjust enrichment, most of which fall
within the concept of generosity, as will be explained presently. The
distinction is clear; nobody except perhaps a lawyer would say that a
person who insists on retaining benefits obtained through accident or
mistake'121-for example through payments to a person wrongly sup-
posed to be the creditor, or delivery to the wrong person-or through
gift from a defrauder or purchase from a known defrauder, was an
honest man; nor would the term generosity be appropriate to describe
the nature of the obligation. The return of property acquired under
such circumstances would not be characterized in morals as generous
conduct, nor should it be regarded in law as anything other than
honesty. One is not generous in surrendering an advantage to which
he is not entitled; he is merely honest. An agent or other fiduciary
who gains a personal profit out of his relationship would also be
acting in bad faith, as well as dishonestly, as would pledgees or mort-
gagees who retain from the proceeds of the sale of pledged or mort-
gaged property more than the total obligation due from the borrower,
or a co-owner who retains income derived from the use of the entire
property.122 In all these situations relief is administered as part of
the law of quasi contract.12 3
121 An overpayment of rent can be recovered in California. Corson v.
Berson, 86 Cal. 433, 75 P. 7 (1890). Payment made by mistake cannot usually
be recovered in Anglo-American law. In Norton v. Haggett, 117 Vt. 130, 85
A.2d 571 (1952), plaintiff, intending to purchase a mortgage, had it dis-
charged by the holder. Held, the holder was not liable, nor was the owner
of the property, the mortgagor; the plaintiff was an officious intermeddler.
According to the RESTATEMENT OF RESTiTUTION § 43(1) (1936), the loss must
remain where it fell. Payment of another's debt by mistake entitles the
payor to restitution to the extent of the benefit conferred up to the value
of what is given, unless the other disclaims the transaction.
When taxes are paid on the wrong piece of land by mistake, subrogation
to the state's lien for taxes is denied. Brookfield v. Rock Island Improvement
Co., 205 Ark. 573, 169 S.W.2d 662 (1953); see 21 MiNN. L. REv. 218 (1937); 41
MIcH. L. REv. 1188 (1943). Contra, Kressler v. Flynn, 323 Mass. 610, 83
"N.E.2d 876 (1949). An officious payor of another's debt cannot recover from
the debtor. W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 388 (1893). Officious means that
he had no interest to protect. Irvine v. Angus, 93 F. 629 (9th Cir. 1899).
122 Pico V. Columbet, 12 Cal. 414 (1859).
123 Quasi contractual obligations, resting on unjust enrichment, although
they are really delictual in their nature and origin, became separately classi-
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Generosity
Of the moral precepts of good faith, honesty and generosity, upon
which nearly all equitable doctrine rests, the precept of generosity is
the most important and pervasive. The jurisprudential basis for the
application of this moral precept in law through the mediation of
equity has been definitively set forth by Stammler, one of the tower-
ing figures of the Neo-Kantian School. Stamnler's concept of just
law, based on the concept of human brotherhood embodied in the
Golden Rule, is formulated in terms of the ideal community. His
definition of neighbor is taken from the parable of the good Samari-
tan, who finds his neighbor to be the one who is in need. Stamrnler's
formula of the ideal community comprehends not only the whole
social community but the inner community composed of persons who
have entered into or have become bound by relationships which are
subject to the operation of legal norms. In such relationships the
party injured and the party who has injured the other are united in a
separate community; the interests of these members of the inner
community must be adjusted in accordance with the principles of just
law. These principles require sacrifice on the part of the person who
has been injured by the action of the other, but not to the extent of
being himself excluded from the reciprocal obligation of the one who
has caused the injury. This is what Stammler means by his phrase
that every man remains his own neighbor, that is, an end in himself.
The principles of the ideal community thus recognize the propriety
of protection of the rights which have been invaded as well as the
propriety of enduring the loss arising from the misfortune which has
occurred. The loss must be divided; this is the social ideal.
124
The equitable concept of generosity requires the relinquishment
of, or compensation for, benefits acquired or positions of advantage
arising out of services rendered or consensual agreements or from
ownership of property, and requires compensation for unsuccessful
efforts to provide assistance. The concept also applies to situations
which require affirmative action where a slight effort would prevent
a great loss to another person. Obligations of this nature fall into
fled, first in Roman law and later in English law because of procedural dif-
ficulties of enforcement in both systems. The separate classification is firmly
established in both common and civil law. The medieval glossators treated
quasi contractual obligations as equitable, basing them on the same concept
of bona fides which was the basis of obligations arising out of contract.- Al-
though this explanation is subject to logical criticism because of the non-
consensual nature of quasi contractual obligations, the classification as equit-
able is justified from the viewpoint of moral content, because these obliga-
tions fall within the second moral level, since legal condemnation of their
violation is not essential to the social order but rests on the mandate of a
more exacting social conscience
124 R. STAmVImLER, WniTscHAPrT uN RECHT 600 (2d ed. 1906).
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four broad classifications which cut across the conventional subdivi-
sions of law into contracts, quasi contracts, property and torts. One
of these categories consists of cases in which the assertion of a right
would be of no material benefit, or of only relatively slight benefit.
Examples are cases of encroachments which are harmless to the prop-
erty owner but the removal of which would entail great hardship to
the encroacher; 125 cases of ameliorating waste;126 delayed perform-
ance of contractual obligations where the damage caused by the delay
can be adequately compensated for; 127 and relief for failure to comply
with formal requirements of law, as for example where there has been
part performance of an oral contract for the sale of land.
128
Another category of obligations in which the concept of gener-
osity is relevant comprises cases in which only a comparatively tri-
fling effort or expenditure is required to avert serious hardship to
another person. Such cases present the principle of mitigation of
damages by reducing the loss. Examples are the requirement in a
few states that a landlord make reasonable efforts to re-let premises
abandoned by his tenant before the end of the lease;1 29 the require-
ment that a buyer make reasonable efforts to re-sell perishable goods
which have been rejected by him;130 the obligation of a tenant to
make trifling repairs to avert a serious deterioration of the premises,
the doctrine of permissive waste; 131 the responsibility of involuntary
bailees not to unreasonably endanger the bailed property; 13 2 and the
125 Johnson v. Killian, 157 Fla. 754, 27 So. 345 (1946) (court refused
to order removal of concrete wall inadvertently constructed 1 foot inside
plaintiff's property); Thomas v. Evans, 105 N.Y. 601 (1887) (unintentional
encroachment of house 18 inches on plaintiff's driveway; injunction denied).
126 Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738 (1899).
127 King v. Connors, 222 Mass. 261, 110 N.E. 289 (1915).
128 Allen v. Moore, 30 Colo. 70 P. 682 (1902); see Cardozo, Comments, in
LAw AND PHmosoPHY 333 (S. Hook ed. 1964) (on the search to escape the
effects of the Statute of Frauds).
129 E.g., Marmont v. Axe, 135 Kan. 368, 10 P.2d 826 (1932); Patton v.
Milwaukee Commercial Bank, 222 Wis. 167, 263 N.W. 124 (1936). The over-
whelming weight of authority, however, is contra; see, e.g., Boardman Realty
Co. v. Carlin, 82 Conn. 413, 74 A. 682 (1919); McGrath v. Shalett, 114 Conn. 622,
159 A. 633 (1932); Richards v. Libby, 136 Me. 376, 10 A.2d 609 (1940); Mc-
Cormick, The Rights of the Landlord upon Abandonment of the Premises by
the Tenant, 23 MicH. L. REv. 211 (1925) (favors the imposition of a duty on
the landlord to make a reasonable effort to re-let).
130 A rescinding purchaser must, if the seller refuses to take back the
goods, save unnecessary loss by selling them if they are perishable. U i-
FoRMv COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-603. On the seller's duty respecting perishable
goods which have been refused, see S. WILLISTON, SALES § 559 (3d ed. 1948).
The seller must exercise his right to resell with reasonable care and judg-
ment. UNoIFORM SALES ACT § 60 (5).
131 Suydam v. Jackson, 54 N.Y. 450 (1873); Townsend v. Moore, 33 N.J.L.
284 (Sup. Ct. 1869).
132 Cowen v. Pressprich, 117 Misc. 663, 192 N.Y.S. 242 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd,
202 App. Div. 796, 194 N.Y.S. 926 (1922).
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requirement of marshalling assets of an insolvent debtor for the bene-
fit of sureties or guarantors.133
A third category consists of cases which require payment for
benefits obtained by services rendered, or improvements of property
made, without valid prior authorization. In such situations there
are no contract rights which, according to strict interpretation of
the rights which are involved, would justify the retention of the
benefits without making restitution. Examples of situations fall-
ing within this category are cases of improvement of property by
mistake,134 services rendered without proper authorization under a
mistake of fact,135 services rendered in an emergency to protect
life136 or property, 37 burial of the dead,138 necessaries furnished
to minors or incompetents for whom another person is responsible, 3 9
and unauthorized use of property. 40 Relief in these situations is pro-
vided in the law of quasi contracts or contracts.
A fourth category is made up in part of cases in which benefits
have been received in the course of consensual relationships, and in
which, therefore, the retention of benefits would be justified accord-
ing to strict law, and in part of cases arising out of delictual encoun-
133 A. STEARNs, SURETYsHIP 238 (1951).
'34 See Thurston, Recent Developments in Restitution: 1940-1947, 45
MxcH. L. REv. 935, 950-53 (1947); Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 11 (1950); Note, Good
Faith and the Right to Compensation for Improvements on Land of Another,
6 W. REs. L. REv. 397 (1955); 48 iicH. L. REV. 885 (1950); F. WooDwARD,
QUASI CoNTRaAc s 187 (1913).
135 See J. POMEROY, EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE § 1241 (5th ed. 1941).
136 There is a duty to help in the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, and
France. See Dawson, Rewards for the Rescue of Human Life?, FESTSC IT
YNTEmA 142 (1961); WooDwARD, supra note 134, at § 191; FRENC H C= CODE
arts. 1372-75; ITALIAN CrvIL CODE arts. 1141-44. A physician was held to be
entitled to recover against parents who had not objected to his services to
their daughter. Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953); see 39
CORN. L.Q. 337 (1954).
137 Recovery in quasi contract was allowed for contractors who repaired
holes in the roof of a business building on which they were working, although
this work had not been authorized by the absentee owner. Berry v. Barbour,
279 P.2d 335 (Okla. 1954); see 53 MIcH. L. REV. 1013 (1955); J. DAwsON & G.
PALmER, supra note 102, at 582. Maritime salvage operations: Robinson,
The Admiralty Law of Salvage, 23 ConN. L.Q. 229 (1938); Lorenzen, The
Negotiorum Gestio in Roman and Modern Civil Law, 13 CORN. L.Q. 190 (1928);
J. DAwsoN, UNJUST ENRCHMwENT 136 (1951).
138 F. WooDwARD, supra note 134, at § 205.
3.9 Id. at § 202 (2).
140 Bright v. Boyd, 4 F. Cas. 134 (C.C.D. Me. 1843); see J. DAWSON & G.
PALmR, supra note 102, at 552 referring to a case involving a suit for the
value of use and occupation, in which deduction for the value of improvements
made under mistake as to ownership was allowed. Where the owner
acquiesces in the improvement without objection, the improver was allowed
to recover in Olin v. Reinecke, 336 Ill. 530, 168 N.E. 676 (1929); see Annot., 76
A.L.R. 304 (1932) (citing cases in accord with Olin, supra). For decisions
under statutes, see Annot., 137 A.L.R. 1078 (1942).
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ters. This category requires not merely the relinquishment of rights
or payment for benefits received, but requires assuming or sharing
the burden resulting from accident or mistake.141 Examples in the
area of consensual relationships are unilateral mistake in contract-
ing,142 frustration of the contractual purpose,143 performance of un-
enforceable contracts,'" cases of part performance of contracts prior
to default,1 4 5 or where complete performance has become impossi-
141 "Sacrifices in various directions is one of the commonplace facts of
our social structure, and we now assume, a normal fact." W. HocKiNG, TEE
PRESENT STATUS OF THE PILOSOPHY OF LAW AN-D OF RIGHTS 27 (1926).
142 E.g., M. F. Kemper Construction Co. v. Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d. 696,
235 P.2d 7 (1951); Goodrich v. Lathrop, 94 Cal. 56, 29 P. 329 (1892) (purchase
of the wrong lot); Cleghorn v. Zumwalt, 83 Cal. 155, 23 P. 294 (1890) (con-
tract called for a one-fifth interest rather than three-fourths as intended);
Watkins v. Carrig, 91 N.H. 459, 21 A. 591 (1941) (ignorance of bed of solid
rock to be extracted); Welles v. Yates, 44 N.Y. 525 (1871) (conveyance of
land without reservation of timber, as had been intended); Ashworth V.
Charlesworth, 119 Utah 650, 231 P.2d 724 (1951) (contract to supply, install,
and paint a structural steel bridge priced too low because of a mistake as
to the size of the bridge). See Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 9 (1948); Comment, Present
Day Labor Litigation, 30 YALE L.J. 501, 506 (1921). If the risk is assumed,
recission will be denied.
'43 Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 45 (1916)
(relief given at law); Dailey v. Clark, 128 Mich. 591, 87 N.W. 761 (1901);
Bergsted v. Bender, 222 S.W. 547 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920). See A. ComIN,
CONTRACTS § 156 (1951); Griel v. Mabson, 179 Ala. 444, 60 So. 876 (1912).
144 Minsky's Follies v. Sennes, 206 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1953). In First Nat'l
Bank v. Oberne, 121 Ill. 25, 7 N.E. 85 (1886) the court held that benefits re-
ceived by defendant from plaintiff, who had thought that he had a contract
with defendant, although the person he dealt with was in fact without author-
ity to bind the defendant, cannot be recovered. Accord, Purvis v. Martin,
122 Me. 73, 118 A. 892 (1922). See Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 131 Mass.
397 (1881); Dresser v. Kronberg, 108 Me. 423, 81 A. 487 (1911); Jensen v.
Provert, 174 Ore. 143, 148 P.2d 248 (1944); Annot., 104 A.L.R. 577; Annot,
1916D L.R.A. 895; 47 L.R.A.N.S. 639 (1912); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §
42 (1936); Thurston, supra note 134; Norton v. Haggert, 117 Vt. 130, 85
A.2d 571 (1952).
145 W. KEENER, QUASI-CONTRACTS 227 (1893). A contracting party in
default may recover the amount of the actual benefit conferred on the other
party, 5 A. CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 1114 (2d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 357 (1932); see Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing & Pub. Co.,
206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953); Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 701 (1950); Thurston, supra
note 134, at 950-53. There is less readiness to recognize the buyer's claim. See
J. DAWSON & PALMER, supra note 102, at 443. Recovery on a building contract
in spite of nonsubstantial deviations is allowed, Note, 31 COLum. L.R. 307
(1931); cf. Jacobs & Young v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1923). The
right to restitution depends on whether the breach was "willful and deliber-
ate." RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1932). In Niman v. Story, 213 Mich.
397, 181 N.W. 1017 (1921), a purchaser who had paid a substantial amount
for a piano purchased by him under a conditional bill of sale was denied re-
covery of the sums he had paid, on his default in payment of the balance
of the purchase price. See J. DAWSON & G. PALMER, supra note 102, at 448.
If the default was willful, recovery is denied. F. WOODWARD, supra note 134,
at § 175 (2). Otherwise recovery is allowed even if the breach was substan-
tial. F. WooDwARD, supra note 134, at § 175.
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ble,146 or of contracts which have been rescinded for misrepresenta-
tion or breach of warranty,147 and cases which present the problem
of balancing hardship in granting or denying decrees for specific per-
formance or injunctions. 48 In the area of delictual encounters, this
basis of equitable obligation is applicable in connection with the prob-
lem of balancing interests affected by the creation of nuisances, 49 in
cases of concurrent fault, and in cases of products liability. Products
liability for damage without fault is imposed either on the ground of
an enforced assumption, by the purveyor of the product, of the risk
of injury caused by the product,150 or in situations in which the loss
can be shifted to the community, through increased prices, from the
person who is held directly responsible.' 5 ' An example in public law
is workmen's compensation statutes, which shift the burden of acci-
dental injury to the community, through taxes. Concurrent fault re-
quires the sharing of responsibility for accidents to which the negli-
gence of each party was a contributing factor.
It will be seen that the concepts of honesty and generosity cover
two classes of unjust enrichment. The concept of honesty applies to
cases of unjust enrichment where there has been no prior agreement
between the persons concerned for the adjustment of their interests,
a situation where the enrichment would be unjustified even at strict
law. The concept of generosity applies in cases where the possibility
146 Tainter v. Cole, 120 Mass. 162 (1878); Milkman v. Ordway, 106 Mass.
232 (1870); Steinberg v. O'Brien, 48 N.J. Eq. 370 (ch. 1891); Fenton v. Clark,
11 Vt. 557 (1839) (employee forced by illness to stop work before the end
of a 4-month contract; recovery in quasi contract granted); see F. WooD-
wARD, supra note 134, at § 112.
147 American Pure Food Co. v. Elliott, 151 N.C. 393, 66 S.E. 451 (1909);
J. DAwsoN & G. PALMER, supra note 102, at 246. A profit which a purchaser
would have made if the contract had been performed, is excluded in the
case of his rescission for fraudulent misrepresentations or breach of war-
ranty by the vendor. A vendee's lien on land after rescission for failure of
title will not include lost profits. See Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1154 (1939). But
see Holdern v. Efficient Craftsman Corp., 234 N.Y. 437, 138 N.E. 85 (1923);
Miswalde-Wilde Co. v. Armory Realty Co., 210 Wis. 53, 243 N.W. 492 (1933).
148 Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 65a
(1904) (injunction against continued operation of plant denied, because
damage to plaintiff's crops from fumes would afford substantial relief, and
closing plant would cause economic suffering to the community).
149 Crabtree v. City Auto Salvage Co., 47 Tenn. App. 616, 340 S.W.2d 940
(1960) (only excessive dust and noxious odors prohibited); Madison v. Duck-
town Sulpher, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
150 See Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV.
1077 (1965).
151 A. DENNING, THE ROAD TO JusTIcE 116 (1955): "The law must adopt
a new test. Not 'whose fault was it?' but 'on whom should the risk fall?' ...
They should cover themselves by insurance against it." See Cowan, supra
note 150, at 1088 (risk of loss shifted from consumer to producer); Patter-
son, The Appointment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 CoLVM.
L. REv. 335, 358 (1924); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liabil-
ity to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960).
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of such eventual enrichment was inherent in a prior consensual agree-
ment, a situation in which the enrichment would according to strict
law be justified.152
There is a wide divergence between the common law and the
civil law as to the desirability of introducing into legal norms stand-
ards at the second moral level. In the civil law the standards of con-
duct required by the concepts of good faith, honesty and generosity
are accepted without qualification. The acceptance of these standards
has not impaired to any perceptible extent the element of certainty
either in the civil law or in the areas of common law in which such
acceptance has occurred: trusts, quasi contract, fraud, and contracts
of insurance and suretyship. In other areas of the common law they
have been received only imperfectly and sporadically. Civil law sys-
tems have applied the standards of good morals without particular-
izing to any great extent as to the kinds of immoral conduct which the
law condemns; the law of torts is compressed within five terse articles
of the French Civil Code. Rights and duties are less minutely classi-
fied than in the common law, leaving more room for discretion in the
application of the norms. The merit of this approach is that moral
concepts are enforced as elements of legal norms to a much greater
extent than in the common law. The disadvantage is that the ques-
tion of what are the standards of virtuous conduct which ought to be
applied in a given situation is left to judicial discretion to a much
greater extent than is the case in Anglo-American law.
The acceptance of the moral standards of equity constitutes the
outstanding merit of the civil law. Its extension to many parts of the
world may be explained not only by its simplicity but by its appeal to
universal criteria of justice. The uneven application of the principles
of pure equity in Anglo-American law violates both logic and com-
mon sense. Either it is right for the law to give relief from hardship
due to accident, mistake, unfairness or misfortune, or it is not. If it is
not right, then the law should not give relief even when the plaintiff
seeks relief through a decree for specific performance or an injunction,
rather than damages. If it is right to give relief under such circum-
stances, then the law should also give relief when the plaintiff sues
for damages, which are merely a substitutionary remedy for injury
caused by the breach of a legal duty. As Chafee has said, "suits for
152 Such classification of quasi contractual liability may help to reduce
the uncertainty which has been expressed by jurists in different parts of
the world as to the basis of unjust enrichment. "The most obvious com-
ment about the American law of restitution is that it lacks any kind of system.
... The price we pay for this includes, among other things, a serious and
growing confusion in analysis, a lack of overall intelligibility, and much dif-
ficulty in prediction." Dawson, supra note 136, at 112. "The concept [of
unjust enrichment] remains badly defined." G. RIPERT, LA REGLE MORALE DANS
LES OBLIGATIONS CimVIES No. 133 (4th ed. 1949).
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breach of contract involve morality, within the proper limits of its
application in a courthouse, just as much as suits for specific perform-
ance.' 51 8 If a person who has cheated another person is not to be
allowed to obtain specific property by such means, he should not be
given damages. Reasoning, as Pound has pointed out, is largely a
process of comparison. 5 4 We have become accustomed to compare
principles of equity with principles of law by taking as the basis of
comparison the difference in the remedy which is sought or available,
depending on whether the action is for damages or for specific relief.
We apply the tests of fair play or of unilateral mistake, in suits for
specific relief, and different tests, fraud or mutual mistake, when the
action is for damages; we do this without realizing that in both kinds
of actions the objective is to enforce standards of fair dealing or con-
tracts which have been intelligently undertaken, with proper con-
sideration for the hardship to others if these equitable considerations
were to be applied.
Each system, common law and civil law, has much to learn from
the other. The situations in which equity has not been successfully
absorbed into the norms of civil law are sufficiently numerous5 5 to
justify even civilian lawyers and jurists in giving consideration to
the results of the Anglo-American experience. The civil law can use
the clearly defined principles of Anglo-American equity as a guide
to ascertain the extent of the actual reception of moral doctrine and as
a basis for correction in areas in which the reception has been imper-
fect. The common law can profit from the much more successful ex-
perience of the civil law in applying the principles of pure equity in
all situations in which they are relevant, without regard to whether
or not the rights of the parties can be enforced specifically. In both
systems equity may usefully be employed to harmonize what Pound
has called "the fragments of law lying on the surface of the legal
order"'5 6 into "the developing universal law of today.' 57 It has been
said that "the mind of man is not passive wax upon which experience
and sensation write their absolute and yet whimsical will; it is an
active organ which moulds and coordinates sensations into ideas, an
organ which transforms the chaotic multiplicity of experience into
153 Z. CHAFEE, SoME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 29 (1950).
154 R. POUND, LAW FINDING THROUGH REASON AND EXPERIENCE 46 (1960).
155 I have referred to some of these areas of imperfect reception of equity
in the civil law in La Nature de l'equite en "droit civil," 60 REVUE INTERA-
TioNALE DE DROIT COMPARE 289 (1964); and in Funzione della pura equitd nel
diritto moderno, 40 REVISTA INTERNAZIONALE Di FILosoFA DEL Dn To 647
(1963).
156 Preface to R. POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW VII-
VIII (Rev. ed. 1954).
157 Pound, What Do We Ask of Legal History?, 11 AM. U.L. REv. 117, 121
(1962).
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the ordered unity of thought."158 In both legal systems equity pro-
vides a compass by which the course of the law may be charted into
channels of humane and compassionate justice. The hidden equity,
like God's law, is not far off;159 it lies in the conscience of mankind.
158 Preface to KA1NT, CRiTiQUE OF PURE REAsON xxix.
159 Deuteronomy 30:11, 14 (King James): "For this commandment which
I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off...
But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that
thou mayest do it."
